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ABSTRACT: The chief current problems for Europe, apart from possible decisions 
bearing on the Schengen Treaty and its costs, concern compliance with the rules 
on the government budget deficit (3 per cent of GDP) and the public debt (60 per 
cent). The annual budget constraint is attenuated by the possibility of flexible 
application for individual members, while the debt limit is harshened by the Fis-
cal Compact, which requires members to bring the ratio down below the 60 per 
cent threshold within 20 years. 
The Italian government’s recent critical stance on a European Monetary 
Union more concerned with budgetary rigor, measured in percentage points, 
than with growth, gauged by more jobs and higher living standards, constitutes 
an important stimulus for rethinking the institutional architecture of the treaties 
and regulations in force. 
The premises for the euro highlight the problems and constraints that 
would plague its proper implementation. 
 
SUMMARY: 1. Rigor, rules and interpretations. - 2. Speculation: from exchange rates to sover-
eign debt. - 3. Schengen. The last concern. 
 
1. The Italian government’s recent critical stance on a European Mone-
tary Union more concerned with budgetary rigor, measured in percentage 
points, than with growth, gauged by more jobs and higher living standards, con-
stitutes an important stimulus for rethinking the institutional architecture of the 
treaties and regulations in force. To better grasp the need for change, one need 
merely ask why, of the 200 or so countries that now make up our world, only 
the few that belong to the European Monetary Union are subject to such strin-
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gent budget constraints and why the euro area is growing less than other re-
gions, in particular the United States, the epicenter of the subprime mortgage 
crisis. 
The chief current problems for Europe, apart from possible decisions 
bearing on the Schengen Treaty and its costs, concern compliance with the rules 
on the government budget deficit (3 per cent of GDP) and the public debt (60 
per cent). The annual budget constraint is attenuated by the possibility of flexi-
ble application for individual members, while the debt limit is harshened by the 
Fiscal Compact, which requires members to bring the ratio down below the 60 
per cent threshold within 20 years.1 It is worth recalling that if the Union’s 
objectives for inflation and long-term interest rates have been practically at-
tained, owing in part to the recession caused by the sacrifices imposed by eco-
nomic convergence, as regards the objective of fiscal sustainability four of the 
twelve original signatories of the Maastricht Treaty were running deficits larger 
than 3 per cent in 1991 (Portugal and Belgium, 7.2 per cent; Greece, 11 per 
cent; and Italy, 11.4 per cent), and at the end of that year five had debt ratios 
higher than 60 per cent (Belgium, 127 per cent; Greece, 82.2 per cent; Ireland, 
94.4 per cent; Italy, 98.0 per cent; and the Netherlands, 73.7 per cent).  
At the first of three scheduled monitoring exercises, at the end of 1993, 
the countries failing to comply with the deficit ratio were again Italy, whose 
deficit had come down to 10 per cent, Belgium, where it was unchanged, Aus-
tria (which joined the European Union on 1 January 1995, together with Sweden 
and Finland) at 4.2 per cent, and France, at 5.9 per cent. 
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At the second assessment, as of 31 December 1996 nine members were 
above the 3 per cent threshold and seven in violation of the 60 per cent debt 
ratio limit. And despite improvements on the deficit front, at the final verifica-
tion, 31 July 1998, the debt ratio was above the limit in seven countries and had 
risen in a good many others: by 20.1 percentage points in Germany, 22.3 in 
France, and 31.8 in Greece. After the three assessments, 11 of 12 countries 
were admitted to the single currency. Greece was admitted under derogation, 
soon to be terminated. 
The acceptance of these members, which ignored their public finance 
problems, was possible thanks to an interpretation of Article 104C(b) of the 
Treaty that had been adopted in the earlier exercises as well; namely, greater 
importance was assigned to the deficit than to the debt ratio. As in December 
1991, when the Treaty had been signed but not yet ratified, five member states 
had debt ratios higher than 60 per cent, it was posited that there was no defi-
nite limit to the volume of the public debt, and that accordingly it was sufficient 
for the debt to be coming down towards the desired value at a satisfactory 
pace, with no specific timetable for attaining it.2 This is the reading that has now 
brought, instead, the Fiscal Compact, which lays down rigid time and quantity 
standards for lowering the debt ratio to 60 per cent. Here, one of the linchpins 
of modern economic theory has been – willfully – ignored: the Ricardian 
equivalence proposition, set forth in the second decade of the 19th century and 
refined by R. Barro in 1974, which postulates that the public debt can increase 
as long as the additional tax revenue deriving from greater economic growth 
                                                                
2
See, GUARINO, L’Europa imperfetta. Ue: problemi, analisi, prospettive, in Id., Diritto ed 
economia. L’Italia, l’Europa, il mondo, “I Quaderni di Economia italiana”, No. 8, 2011, pp. 
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Id., The Internationalization Process in Southern Italy, “Review of EconomicConditions in 
Italy”, 2011/2-3, pp. 495-517; Id., L’Europa tradita. Dall’economia di mercato all’economia 
del profitto, in F. Capriglione (ed.), La nuova disciplina della società europea, Cedam, Padua, 
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produced by larger deficits is enough to cover the interest payments principal 
repayments on the debt. 
As for the deficit ratio, the rules allowed for overshoots in temporary, ex-
ceptional circumstances. Hence, the deficit requirement turned out to be a nec-
essary and sufficient condition for convergence on the standards of admission 
to the single currency. 
Italy, with its very high public debt, in order to qualify quickly applied the 
Ricardian equivalence, enacting a burdensome “Eurotax” and not following the 
UK’s lead in “opting out” under the Maastricht Treaty clause that allowed mem-
ber countries not to adhere immediately, pending further consideration.3 
These premises for the euro highlight the problems and constraints that 
would plague its proper implementation. 
What, then, were the criteria behind the 3 and 60 per cent limits? And 
what economists endorsed such limits in theory?  
Before the advent of the euro, the 3 per cent deficit parameter was as-
cribed to the so-called “golden rule of fiscal policy,” namely that government 
should not borrow to finance current spending and that the deficit should 
therefore not exceed public investment expenditure, which was around that 
level in a good number of countries. Or else it referred to the benchmark ap-
plied by West Germany. Or, yet again, it was said to correspond to the deficit at 
which a public debt of 60 per cent of GDP could be financed at an interest rate 
of 5 per cent. This third criterion, however, implies a balanced budget net of in-
terest payments and thus conflicts with the medium-term objectives of the Sta-
bility and Growth Pact.4 Yet the Delors Report, upon which the Maastricht 
Treaty was based, only spoke of the need to “impose effective upper limits on 
budget deficits of individual member countries”; it did not quantify them.  
                                                                
3
See, SAVONA, Eresie, esorcismi e scelte giuste per uscire dalla crisi. Il caso Italia, Rubettino, 
Soveria Mannelli, 2012, p. 46.  
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See , MAGNIFICO, Euro: squilibri finanziari e spiragli di soluzione, LUISS University Press, 
Rome, 2008, p. 239. 
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Thanks to the French daily Aujourd’hui, we now know how the 3 per cent 
deficit ratio originated and how it was adopted by the technocrats of Brussels. 
Its inventor was Guy Abeille, a budget department functionary at the French Fi-
nance Ministry during the presidency of François Mitterrand. The standard was 
set “with no theoretical reflection whatever,” Abeille has said. “Mitterrand 
needed an easy rule to use in order to turn down ministers who came to ask for 
money. … We needed something simple.” At the time, in the early ’80s, France 
was running a deficit of around 2.6 per cent, so “proposing 1 per cent would 
have been too hard, unfeasible,” 2 per cent would have “put the government 
under too much pressure”; the figure was therefore fixed at 3 per cent. “3 per 
cent? It’s a good number, a historic number, calling the Trinity to mind.” And in 
fact the former head of the Bundesbank, Hans Tietmeyer, acknowledged that 
the standard was “economically not easy to explain.” The most striking thing, as 
Aujourd’hui emphasizes, is that the Brussels technocrats adopted the same 
method in their recent determination of “another seeming, and equally false, 
Cartesian rule: the structural deficit ceiling of 0.5 per cent. Why not 1 per cent 
or 2 per cent? No one knows.”5 
There has been no lack of proposals for modifying these postulates. The 
European Economic Advisory Group advocates modulating the budget con-
straints depending on the size of the country’s debt. Other scholars hold that 
there is a need for some deficit flexibility in accordance with national economic 
growth rates. And the list could be extended.6 So far, however, nothing has 
changed – least of all the obstinacy of the Eurocracy. 
The theoretical underpinnings of the 60 per cent debt ratio are traceable 
to what was called, in the ’90s, “expansionary austerity,” by now part of the 
mainstream neoclassical market model. Under the theory of expectations, the 
reduction of the sovereign debt thanks to fiscal consolidation through spending 
                                                                
5
See, DI TARANTO, Ragioni liberali per criticare certi eccessi dell’austerity, “Il Foglio”, 16 
November 2012; V. Lops, Parla l’inventore della formula del 3% sul deficit/pil: ‘Parametro 
deciso in meno di un’ora, senza basi teoriche, “Il Sole 24 Ore”, 29 January 2014. 
6
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cuts will stimulate growth, because the cuts are perceived as the signal of future 
tax reductions and hence higher expected incomes. But the recent crisis has 
demonstrated that “expansionary” austerity was, instead, recessionary. The In-
ternational Monetary Fund, at first the most vehement of the Troika’s advo-
cates of austerity, has now had to recognize that the fiscal multipliers have been 
higher during the recession than before: 1.5 instead of 0.5, meaning that a fiscal 
contraction of €1.00 had a recessionary impact of €1.50 on the economy, and 
not of €0.50, as the theorists of expansionary austerity had estimated.7 
The thesis of a negative correlation between debt and growth has been 
recently resumed and sustained by Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff of 
Harvard. Based on empirical studies, they show that in the long run countries 
with high sovereign debt – over 90 per cent of GDP, hence well above the more 
restrictive 60 per cent parameter laid down by the European treaties and regu-
lations - have lower growth. The study has been taken as the scientific justifica-
tion for the adoption of austerity policies within the euro area and for the rule 
requiring reduction of the public debt to 60 per cent of GDP, including by means 
of the Fiscal Compact and the incorporation of the balanced-budget principle in 
national constitutions.  
But this empirical work on the correlation between debt and growth is 
flawed by spreadsheet errors, as was discovered by researchers at the Univer-
sity of Massachusetts and as Reinhart and Rogoff have admitted. What is more, 
it has been shown that there is in fact no “threshold effect,” such as a ceiling of, 
say, 60 per cent, and no direct causal nexus between debt and growth. Finally, 
the consequences vary from country to country, while empirical studies on the 
Reinhart-Rogoff model simply postulate that the relationship between debt and 
growth is the same independent of context. “The hypothesis could potentially 
                                                                
7
See, DANIELE, L’austerità espansiva e i numeri (sbagliati) di Reinhart e Rogoff, “Economia e 
Politica”, 20 June 2013, http://www.economiaepolitica.it/index.php/primo-piano/lausterita-
espansiva-e-i-numeri-sbagliati-di-reinhart-e-rogoff/. For Italy, PISAURO, Il risanamento dei 
conti pubblici, “Economia italiana”, No. 1, 2012, pp. 37-61; IMF, World Economic and 
Financial Surveys. Fiscal Monitor, October 2012, p. 53 ff. 
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produce misleading results, and studies using statistical techniques that do not 
so postulate cast doubt on the negative correlation between debt and growth in 
the advanced countries.”8 
 
 
2. The advent of the single European currency has resulted in a switch in 
the focus of currency speculation, from exchange rates – which were flexible 
after 1978 both under the old monetary snake and also, albeit within a fixed 
fluctuation band, under the European Monetary System – to the rates of inter-
est on the public debt of different countries. In other words, speculators 
switched from currencies as the representation of the conditions of a national 
economy to the market’s confidence in a State’s sovereign debt. While the 
spread between ten-year Italian Treasury bonds and German Bunds was 600 ba-
sis points in 1991 when Germany was reunified, rose to 700 basis points with 
the speculative attacks on Italy in 1992, and remained over 300 basis points un-
til 1996, not a single analyst cited this as proof of Italy’s economic weakness 
relative to Germany. The spread then declined and with the advent of the euro 
recorded negative values from 1997 to 2007, marking the first but in many re-
spects also the last success for the single currency. As Jacques Sapir has noted, it 
went unobserved – or ignored – that this was the only sphere in which some 
effective unification was achieved at the time: “Product prices remained quite 
diverse across the various euro-area countries, and the prices of shares listed in 
the various stock exchanges absolutely failed to converge. Worse still, the dif-
                                                                
8
See, PANIZZA - PRESBITERO, Quel nesso da dimostrare tra debito e crescita, “lavoce.info”, 
20 April 2013; REINHART - ROGOFF, Growth in a Time of Debt, “American Economic Re-
view”, Vol. 100, No. 2, 2010, pp. 573-578; T. Herndon, M. Ash, R. Pollin, Does High Public 
Debt Consistently Stifle Economic Growth? A Critique of Reinhart and Rogoff, PERI Working 
paper No. 322, April 15, 2013, For the full text, see: 
http://www.peri.umass.edu/fileadmin/pdf/working_papers/working_papers_301-
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ferences in economic trends between the countries of the euro area continued 
to increase.”9 
The shortcomings of Europe’s institutional architecture were then 
thrown into relief by the subprime mortgage crisis that broke out in the United 
States, the subsequent failure of major investment banks – first Bear Stearns, 
then Lehman Brothers – and Prime Minister Georgios Papandreou’s declaration 
that Greece risked default. The resulting contraction of liquidity widened inter-
est rate spreads vis-à-vis ten-year German bonds, spreads that hit their maxi-
mum during the summer of 2011 in Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain 
(the “PIIGS” countries) but also in Belgium. Actually, this constituted the realiza-
tion of the conditions laid down by Germany for agreeing to Maastricht – the 
euro area had to arise as a community of financial stability, according to a deci-
sion of the German Constitutional Court, which consequently ruled out any 
form of mutualization of the sovereign debt of countries in difficulty. And given 
this line of thought, the European Central Bank, founded in 1998, could not act 
as lender of last resort, because its sole mandate was for monetary stability, in-
terpreted narrowly as fighting inflation on the model of the Bundesbank.  
Euro-area countries in difficulty, then, given the single currency, cannot 
mutualize their debt, or carry out competitive devaluations, or regulate interest 
rates. The sole instrument they can use to finance themselves is the free capital 
market – an instrument that even in 1999 Joseph Halevi had described as a 
boon to financial rents10 – with a consequent increase in the public debt and the 
transformation of the liquidity crises into solvency crises. These in turn under-
mine investor confidence, threatening economic deterioration in the debtor 
states, insofar as the widening of spreads lowers the value of their government 
securities and means higher debt interest payments. It is no accident that the 
IMF has reconsidered its original position, admitted the damage done by the 
                                                                
9
See, SAPIR, Bisogna uscire dall’euro?, Ombre corte, Verona, 2012, p. 24-39. 
10
See, GRAZIANI, Lo sviluppo dell’economia italiana. Dalla ricostruzione alla moneta unica 
europea, Bollati Boringhieri, Turin, 2001, p. 171. 
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policies of austerity imposed through the Troika,11 and, together with the OECD 
and the European Parliament, recognized the need for some control on capital 
movements. 
The yield on sovereign debt instruments is correlated with the exchange 
rate, inflation, insolvency risk and, solvency being equal, their degree of liquid-
ity. So a German Bund is more attractive in the international capital market than 
an Italian BTP, which in turn is more attractive than analogous bonds issued by 
Greece or Cyprus. Thanks to the soundness and reliability of the German econ-
omy, the Bund would appear to serve as a sort of safe haven. With the advent 
of the single currency, the first of these factors – the exchange rate – was elimi-
nated and variations in inflation expectations were reduced enormously, to far 
less than 2 percentage points above the rates in the three most virtuous coun-
tries as established by the Maastricht Treaty. And in fact until 2007 the average 
spread with respect to German government bonds was only 27 basis points for 
Italy, 28 basis points for Greece, and a mere 9 basis points for Spain. This means 
either that the markets had unlimited confidence in the financial soundness of 
all the euro-area countries or else that they had failed to comprehend one of 
the constituent elements of Maastricht, namely the no-bail-out principle, which 
ensures the stability of the single currency and absolutely precludes any transfer 
of funds between member states.12 
Jean-Paul Fitoussi has rightly observed that “the consequences of foreign 
exchange speculation, while serious, are infinitely less grave than those of 
speculation on the stability of States. The economic and social consequences of 
a currency devaluation are incomparably less severe than those of a bank 
run.”13 In practice, the switch from speculation on exchange rates to speculation 
                                                                
11
See, SAPIR, op. cit., pp. 12-13, 16. For Italy, see “Growth and Financial Stability in Italy. 
Review of Economic Conditions in Italy”, 2012, No. 1. In particulare, PISAURO, The consoli-
dation of the Italian economy, pp. 31-54. 
12
See, SARRAZIN, L’Europa non ha bisogno dell’euro, Castelvecchi, Rome, 2013, pp. 77-78. 
13
See, FITOUSSI, Il teorema del lampione o come mettere fine alla sofferenza sociale, Einaudi, 
Turin, 2013, p. 122. 
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on sovereign interest rates coincided with the transfer of sovereignty from 
States to the supranational economy of finance. Whereas a national govern-
ment can manage exchange rates by open market operations to regulate do-
mestic liquidity through its own central bank or by competitive devaluation – or 
revaluation, as envisaged by the EMS – it is impossible for any country, alone, to 
ward off speculative attacks on its stability, given the enormous volume of capi-
tal that liberalization has injected into the market with the financialization of 
the economy. This is because the euro-area countries’ public debt is denomi-
nated in a supranational currency over which they no longer wield the monetary 
policy powers just mentioned. On the contrary, the crisis is deepened, as the 
danger of a State’s default depresses its bonds, widens the spread, and depreci-
ates the assets of the banks that hold them. Unless government intervenes, 
there is the danger of a bank run – as in Greece – and the flight of capital to 
States with sounder sovereign debt. Obviously this mechanism weakens the 
poorer countries, through speculation, and further enriches the affluent. 
In this regard, Thilo Sarrazin has observed that “a bank that holds gov-
ernment securities denominated in euros takes on an extra risk with respect to 
the securities of a State whose central bank can issue money” and that this 
threatens to undermine its solvency.14 
 
3. Eight months have passed since Schengen’s 30th anniversary: the 
European treaty signed on 14th June 1985 by Belgium, France, Germany, Lux-
embourg and The Netherlands. The abolition of borders and the subsequent 
free movement of persons within the Schengen area represent a major con-
quest for the members of the European Union, as well as a fundamental ele-
ment on which the Union is based.  
The values of solidarity and hospitality promoted by the EU are integral 
part of the Schengen’s Acquis, which is currently applied by 26 countries (22 
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See, SARRAZIN, op. cit., pp. 24-41. 
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European Union members and 4 associated states).  
However, the dream of a united and supportive Europe seems nowadays un-
dermined as nationalism and xenophobia find increasing public approval in 
times of disastrous migrant crisis.  
Saving one of the most important strongholds in European history and 
providing a concrete answer to the ever-increasing migration issues is crucial for 
the future of the “Old Continent”. 
It’s not surprising to see nationalist movements stonewalling the arrival 
of refugees escaping from war, death and misery. Refusal and demonization of 
diversity are just part of their DNA.    
Most worrying, democrats and liberals paved the way to isolationist poli-
cies, taking advantage of legitimate fears in the citizenry for the sake of argu-
able political campaigns.15 
Hungarian Prime Minister Victor Orban caused public outrage last sum-
mer for its decision to build a barrier on the Serbian borders to prevent mi-
grants from entering the country. Decisionist policies in Poland, Czech Republic 
and Macedonia echoed Mr. Orban determination with the announcement of 
drastic and violent solutions in an effort to hinder the refugees flow. The inca-
pacity of the European Union to provide a univocal, well-balanced, answer to 
the crisis and its failure to develop a common sense of belonging for the EU 
members appear to be the real problem.  
Legal gaps and European Union’s lack of preparation in managing the 
phenomenon justify the adoption of restrictive measures and isolationist poli-
cies by moderate governments: blaming Orban’s barbed wire while building in-
visible walls made of tighter border controls and questioning Schengen’s valid-
ity. 
As the crisis sharpens, Schengen’s area shows signs of weakness while 
Austria, Denmark, France and Sweden restore borders 16  pointing their fingers 
                                                                
15
See, ACCARDO, Libera circolazione e immigrazione: trent’anni dopo, che cosa rimane di 
Schengen, “Voxeurop”, 19th June 2015.  
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at the presumed inability of Italy and Greece to patrol the European external 
frontiers. Recent studies show that over one million asylum-seekers crossed the 
EU borders: a remarkable number, especially if compared to 2014 data. Never-
theless, this figure seems more reassuring when confronted to EU total popula-
tion. At this purpose, one million migrants accounts for 0,2%, therefore scaling 
down the crisis magnitude which cannot be compared to the situation Lebanon 
has to face, providing hospitality to one million migrants representing 25% of its 
population.17 
Issues regarding the management and integration of people from differ-
ent worlds in the economic, social and cultural context are undeniable as they 
represent the real challenge to a strong and unite Europe. 
Integration and constructive exchange should be at the very heart of the 
“New Schengen”. The Cologne matters show the urgent need for a balance be-
tween integration and social protection of UE's citizenry. Shutting eyes and 
doors is not a solution. Such a behaviour wouldn’t be respectful of the work and 
hope with which Schengen was created. Incalculable damages would affect 
every EU citizen with a significant reduction in mobility rights that would mean 
living in a degenerated Europe, deprived of that common sense of belonging 
acting as inspirational principle. 
However, Schengen suspension would need the approval of all the 26 
member states and, in any case, would mean unsustainable costs for all the par-
ticipants to the zone.  Cost/benefits analysis on immigration show that aban-
doning Schengen would not bring any advantage.  
The European crisis is serious and Mr. Donald Tusk, President of EU 
Council, gave a 2 months deadline to reform Schengen and find a long-term an-
                                                                                                                                                                                            
16
See, CARLINO, Porte sempre più chiuse per i migranti. Scontri a Kos contro gli hotspot, 
“Euronews”, 15th February 2016.  
17
See, LIBERTI, Chiudere le frontiere in Europa ha conseguenze incalcolabili per tutti, 
“Internazionale”, 18th January 2016.  
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swer to the migrants issue. As time is pressing, a fast response is needed to 
tackle migration crisis.18 
Greece is now experiencing hard times in balancing its economic and so-
cial efforts for both the migrant crisis and the financial issues regarding its debt, 
while Europe still fails in defining a suitable strategy for the current immigration 
problems. 
As Turkey wriggles out of its duties concerning the strengthening of bor-
der controls to stem the migrant flow heading to Greece, Kos is witnessing 
fights between the embittered population and desperate migrants, exhausted 
by inhuman trips and uncertain perspectives.19 
Schengen’s suspension and the redefinition of Europe’s real borders will 
not be an acceptable solution, as this will not help interrupting the migrant flow 
to the Hellenic coastline: blocking desperate migrants in an unprepared country 
will only result in a humanitarian emergency.20 
In this catastrophic context, the European strategy and the relocation 
policy must be redesigned in order to avoid nationalisms and unsustainable 
economic and social costs. In addition to this, the uncertainty about the British 
referendum and the threat of a possible Brexit burden the crisis with an addi-
tional risk factor. Moreover, the commodity crisis and the ghost of recession, 
new and old EU discords, the Eastern “secession” and the possible return of Na-
tion states cast a shadow over the unity of Europe.  
To make the multi-speed Europe matters worse (a division which is 
nowadays less visible as Finnish economic conditions deteriorate), a rift be-
tween Western Europe and radical nationalist Eastern nations follows up.21 Fur-
thermore, the virtuous, unwavering Germany suffers from the impact of one 
                                                                
18
See, CORIAT, 2016: année critique pour l’Union européenne, “Alternative économiques”, 
18th January 2016. 
19
See, GUETTA, Compte à rebours en Europe, “France Inter”, 26th January 2016. 
20
See, PAPACHELAS, Διπλή καταιγίδα στον ορίζοντα, “I Kathimerini”, 17th February 2016. 
21
See, CORIAT, 2016: année critique pour l’Union européenne, “Alternative économiques”, 
18th January 2016. 
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million refugees on the job market, the instability of economic conditions and 
the uncertainty of electoral results.   
Studies outline the possibility of an even worse migration flow in the fu-
ture, as a consequence of climate change. Such a scenario makes the current 
refugees tragedy a mere testbed for Europe, which, if not capable of managing 
the crisis, will give in to more serious and hardly avoidable migration flows.22 
An unanimous, sustainable and responsible solution, outcome of a well-
balance mix of integration and citizenry safeguard, is highly necessary; as well as 
the redefinition of the refugee-sharing scheme with fairer models. 
In response to the struggle among Ministers of the member states and 
Italy and Greece push for the application of EU solidarity principle, the European 
Commission published an agenda concerning the distribution of asylum-seekers 
from Syria, Eritrea and Iraq. The Commission agreed to redistribute migrants on 
the basis of population size (40%), national GDP (40%), unemployment rate 
(10%) and number of refugees hosted during the last 4 years (10%). 
Denmark, United Kingdom and Ireland are excluded from the pro-
gramme, as determined by the Treaty of Lisbon. 
An alternative allocation method has been proposed by two researcher 
from the London School of Economics, basing their study on realistic and prag-
matic criteria.  The hosting capacity of destination countries is analyzed taking 
into consideration three dimensions: internal wealth, job market conditions and 
demographic rate. Internal wealth is estimated by GDP (PPP) per capita, as 
hosting costs are strictly correlated to the cost of living. The greater is the 
wealth of a country, the easier is for it to sustain the migrants-related financial 
costs. Bigger shares, therefore, must be allocated to the richest countries.  
Job market and demographic rates – inasmuch as they can turn the mi-
grant issue into a good economic and social development opportunity - are cru-
cial for the definition of these shares.  A quali-quantitative research is per-
                                                                
22
See, HALL, The Challenge of Financing the Costs of Climate Change, “The Governance 
Posts”, 25th January 2016. 
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formed to analyze the job market conditions, taking into consideration job va-
cancies. Countries with high education level will probably suffer from shortage 
of manpower and less qualified workers.  Demographic structures with low birth 
rates will benefit from refugees (81% is under 35 years old and 55% is 25). 
The 10% correction factor regarding previous hosting commitments is 
omitted as it has little influence on the results of the study. Moreover, econo-
mies of scale offset hosting costs. The outlined shares are highly divergent from 
the ones proposed by the Commission.23 
Regardless of the results, it’s interesting to note that many other redis-
tribution plans are feasible and desirable for a real and supportive cost sharing 
in order to host refugees and save Schengen. 
 
 
                                                                
23
See, BOVENS - BARTSCH, Why the refugee quota system is unfair on poorer eastern and 
souther EU states, “The London School of Economics”, 28th January 2016.  
